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If by the terms of the instrument creating a trust mandatory powers are conferred upon the trustee, although by the instrument no legal estate is limited to him in specific words, he
takes an estate 15and not merely powers, in the absence of a contrary intention.
One would normally think that the exercise of a mere power of sale
in trust should not require the effort and expertise in accounting required of the defendant in the Martin case. Indeed, all that one who
exercises a power of sale should have to do, it seems, is account for the
proceeds and show that he received a reasonable price. Nevertheless,
the trustee in the Martin case undertook the broad administration of all
the property. He supervised some of the assets and completely controlled the others. Although the reported case does not specifically list
any other powers exercised by the trustee, it can be safely assumed that
he did so (investing corpus and income, incurring expenses in preserving the estate, etc.). Such activities only served to increase his responsibilities to account, even though by exercising these other powers, he
exceeded his authority as trustee. Because the trustee undertook to
exercise these added powers and to determine, by himself, his own duties
for ten years, the court in effect estopped him from denying that he had
these added powers for the exercise of which he had to account. The
court said: "If there were any question of the scope of his duties, the
trustee should not have waited ten years before claiming his rights were
less than those which, in fact, he exercised."'"
DONALD J. BAUHS

Insurance: Construction of the Uninsured Motorist Clause: In
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower,' a Virginia case, plaintiff
sued his own insurance carrier. Brower, the insured, was injured when
his automobile was struck by an automobile driven by one Mazza.
Brower sued Mazza for damages and recovered a judgment. Because
Mazza's insurance carrier, National Automobile Insurance Co., had
gone into receivership four months before the action was instituted, it
did not appear in the action, offered no defense, and paid no part of
the judgment.
Plaintiff based his action against his own carrier on the Virginia
uninsured motorist statute. This statute provides that, in all bodily
injury and property damage insurance policies, the insurer shall undertake to pay the insured the amount he is entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.'
The statutes define an uninsured motor vehicle as
supra note 4, § 88, comment c.
16 Estate of Martin, supra note 1, at 341, 124 N.W. 2d at 301.
1 134 S.E. 2d 277 (Va. 1934).
2VA.CODE § 38.1-381(b) (1950).
15 RESTATEMENT,
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a motor vehicle as to which there is no (i) bodily injury liability
insurance and property damage liability insurance . . . or (ii)
there is such insurance but the insurance company writing the
same denies coverage thereunder .... 3
The Virginia Supreme Court held that plaintiff could recover because there had been an implied denial of coverage by National. This
denial consisted in the insurance company's failure to appear, defend
the action, and pay the judgment. The court held that a denial of coverage need not be express to be effective.
In its opinion, the Virginia court mentioned a New York case, UMine
v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnn. Corp.,4 which arrived at the opposite
conclusion. The facts of the Uline case are almost identical to those of
the Brower case. Here also plaintiff received injuries in an automobile
accident. A similar uninsured motorist statute was in effect. As in
Brower, the other party had been insured at the time of the accident, but
his carrier had gone into receivership. The New York court held that
he was not an uninsured motorist. It reasoned that the denial of coverage must be express. Failure to appear and defend because of insolvency
is not the express denial contemplated by the statute.
Wisconsin does not have an uninsured motorist statute, but the
same problem arises in defining "uninsured automobile" as the expression is used in a contract of insurance. The question to be discussed
in this article is whether a Wisconsin court in construing an insurance
contract and defining the term "uninsured automobile" would reach
the result reached in Virginia or that reached in New York. In other
words, would a Wisconsin court consider a motorist uninsured whose
insurance carrier had become insolvent, although such insurance carrier
had not expressly disclaimed liability?
In answering this question it must be remembered that it is a contract of insurance rather than a statute that is being considered. If an
ambiguity can be found the rule that an insurance contract is to be
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured will apply.
However, for this rule to apply, ambiguity must be present. As pointed
out in Bell v. American Ins. Co.:
While insurance contracts should be construed most strictly
against the insurer, yet they are subject to the same rules of
construction applied to the language of any other contract, and
the language used is to be accorded its popular and usual significance. 5
The provisions of the standard contract seem unambiguous. After
providing that the insurer will pay all sums which the insured shall be
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an un3VA. CODE § 38.1-381(c) (1950).
428 Misc. 2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (1961).

5 173 Wis. 533, 536, 181 N.W. 733, 734 (1921).
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insured automobile because of bodily injury, the contract defines "uninsured automobile" as
an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or
use of which there is . . . no bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident . . . or

with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the
company writing the same denies coverage thereunder .... .
(Emphasis added.)
In short, an automobile is uninsured if it is not covered by insurance,
or even if it is so covered, if the carrier denies coverage. As stated in
the Bell case, language used in a contract should be accorded its usual
significance. It does not seem that the usual significance of "disclaim
liability" includes a mere failure to appear and defend because of insolvency. "To deny coverage" contemplates affirmative action. A failure
to appear is obviously not an act at all.
A grammatical analysis of the contract only supports the conclusion
that ambiguity is not present. In defining an uninsured automobile, the
standard policy states that it is an automobile with respect to which
there is no insurance applicable at the time of the accident. It does
not say that an uninsured automobile is one as to which there is no
insurance collectible or payable. Under the contract, to be insured,
an automobile need only have insurance applicable to it.
In discussing limits of liability, the same contract provides that
any amount payable under the terms of this endorsement (uninsured motorist provision) because of bodily injury sustained in
an accident by a person who is an insured under this coverage
shall be reduced by . . . (2) the amount paid and the present

value of all amounts payable on account of such bodily injury
under any workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law
or any similar law.7 (Emphasis added.)
Coverage is not be reduced by the amount of insurance applicable from
any source. It must be actually payable. In attempting to determine
whether a Wisconsin court would ascribe the same meaning to the words
"applicable" and "payable," the case of Merrill v. Travelers' Ins. Co."
is useful. In this case, the court was concerned with the meaning to be
ascribed to a single word in the contract. The court stated:
Policies of insurance are framed probably with greater care and
stricter attention to the language employed than almost any other
kind of contracts, and each sentence, phrase, and word has an
appropriate office and definite meaning. The rule of construction
is that some particular operation, effect, and meaning must be
assigned to each sentence, phrase, and word used, and when
6 Insurance contract issued by the Continental National Insurance Group.
TIbid.
891 Wis. 329, 64 N.W. 1039 (1895).
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this may fairly and properly be done no part of the language
used can be superfluous or unmeaning.0
Applying this reasoning to the contract, one might well ask why the
scrivener used the word applicablewhen he meant payable. If applicable
is to have a meaning of its own, it cannot mean the same thing as
payable.
It may be concluded that Wisconsin would not reach the result of
the Virginia case that a motorist who is insured, but whose carrier has
become insolvent, is uninsured. The uninsured motorist provision of
the standard contract does not on its face provide for such a result.
Since the language is not ambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule that a contract of insurance must be construed against
the insurer.
MARY C. CAHILL
Judgments: Mutuality as an Element of Collateral Estoppel:
Zdanok v. Glidden Co." and its companion case, Alexander v. Glidden
Co.'. both arose out of a collective-bargaining agreement between defendant and a local of the General Warehousemen's Union which represented employees at defendant's food processing plant in Elmhurst,
New York. After the contract had expired, defendant moved its plant
to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
Zdanok and four other former Elmhurst employeese brought an
action in the Supreme Court of New York for New York County,
which was removed by the defendant Glidden on the basis of diversity
of citizenship to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. There, judgment was had against the plaintiffs on
the merits. On appeal, the Second Circuit construed the contract as
entitling plaintiffs to be employed at the defendant's Bethlehem plant,
retaining seniority and reemployment rights acquired at the Elmhurst
plant, and remanded the case to the district court for determination
of plaintiffs' damages.
Alexander and a large number of other Elmhurst employees 4 commenced an action in the same federal district court substantially identical in issue with the Zdanok case. The two actions (Zdanok and Alexander) were consolidated for trial.
Defendant attempted, in the Alexander case, to offer evidence relating to the intent of the parties in negotiating the contract, seeking
a "de novo" construction for purposes of that case. Although admit9Id. at 333.
1327 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
2Ibid.
3

These were the plaintiffs in the original action, Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 216
F. Supp. 476 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
4These plaintiffs joined with the original action on remand to the district
court, Alexander v. Glidden Co., 216 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

